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ABSTRACT

It has been widely recognized that RFID related technologies will greatly improve the visibility, the efficiency and the
collaboration of industry supply chain. In this new “product driven“ supply chain scenario, manufacturer, supplier, and
third party share and coordinate the use of diverse resources in distributed “virtual organizations”. It challenges the
security issues, which demand new technical approaches. In collaboration with researchers in Auto-ID Labs China, we
have developed a service-oriented framework based on CA and Web Services, which supports inexpensive mediation of
product information among rapidly evolving, heterogeneous information sources. Our architecture defines a user-driven
security model that allows users to create entities and policy domains within virtual organizations. We emphasize that
standard Web Services tools and software provide both stateless and stateful forms of secured communication.
Keywords: security service, RFID, supply chain, PKI
1. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a powerful new
technology that is helping companies to improve
visibility into their inventory data and increase accuracy
across supply chain networks. When RFID tags are
attached to products, boxes, and pallets, the items can be
followed automatically as they move, providing a
real-time and accurate view of inventory[1]. The
technology is so effective that organizations such as
Wal-Matt, Metro, and the U.S. Department of Defense
now require their suppliers to deliver goods with RFID
tags.
The Auto-ID Center in MIT, was launched in late 1999,
has developed RFID tags which are cheap enough to be
disposable and readers which are agile enough to de
deployed globally[2]. According to Auto-ID Center’s
researching, the various components of the Auto-ID
infrastructure includes (Figure 1):
z Hardware – such as RFID tags and readers but also
including optical readers and other types of sensors.
z Savant – a software platform for interfacing to
various types of readers and filtering the data
generated when the tags are within range of the
readers.
z The Electronic Product Code (EPC) – a unique
identification number for each object – the
minimum information which must be stored on its
ID tag.
z The Object name service (ONS) – an extension of
the domain name service (DNS), which provides a
method of converting an EPC into the network
address of the corresponding networked database,
which in turn holds the product data for that object.
z The EPC Information Server ( formerly PML
Server) – an open standard XML Schema for
representing information about products and

z

communicating this information globally in a
unified manner, between parties who otherwise
have disparate databases, data storage formats and
who use diverse application programs to act upon
the product data.
Control systems – to provide feedback into the
supply chain or manufacturing process, using the
data generated by EPC readings.

Figure 1 EPC Network Architecture
Source: Autoidcenter.org
Since each unique object will have a unique identifier, in
the form of the EPC, each object will become an
individual, with its own individual history about how it
passed the through supply chain. In this “product driven”
supply chain scenario, manufacturer, supplier, and third
party (like carrier, distribute center) share and coordinate
the use of diverse resources in distributed “virtual
organizations”.
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Let us consider a simple business scenario. The suppliers
and customers (manufacturers) collaborate by sharing
information and exchanging plans via the Supplier
Managed Inventory (SMI) process. The SMI process is a
supplier-driver replenishment and planning process,
which is based on min/max stock balance levels, on
current demand, in-transits and planned shipments.
With RFID enabled, the application now should support
the handlingof massive amounts of Auto-ID data through
connectivity with readers, tags, and other devices; and
integration of high-volumn RFID data with back-end
business processes. The dynamic and multi-parties
nature of these environments introduces challenging
security issues that demand new technical approaches.
Most of data are sensitive, and every server exposed on
internet will be attacked, and so on.
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2. RELATED WORK
2.1 CA-based Trust Model
One commonly used identity token is provided by an
X.509 public key certificate. An X.509 “public key
certificate” is defined in ITUT standard [3] as “the public
key of a user, together with some other information,
rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private
key of the certification authority which issued it.”
[Section 3.3.44]
In practice an X.509 certificate as defined by the PKIX
X.509 Certificate Profile RFC[] contains a public key, a
subject name in the form of a multi-component
Distinguished Name [DN] and a validity period and is
signed by a trusted third party called a Certification
Authority (CA). The X.509 certificates are used with the
TLS(SSL) security protocol to make a secure
authenticated connection between two parties. X.509
certificates are exchanged between entities, usually in a
phase where no security has yet been negotiated (no data
integrity or confidentiality). The certificates are first
tested for validity by checking the expiration dates,
possible revocation, acceptable key usage and if they are
signed by trusted CA. If the certificates pass all these
checks their public keys are then used to build a
challenge handshake to prove that each entity that sent a
certificate has the corresponding private key.
There are other public/private key based schemes such as
PGP keys[4], SSH keys [5]and the SPKI [6] keys and
protocols. The PKIX/X.509 scheme has a smallish set of
trusted third parties (CAs) to sign identity certificates
that contain a subscriber’s public key. This improves the
scaling properties of public key distribution since only
the CA’s public key needs to be distributed in an
out-of-band secure manner. Another feature of the
X.509-TLS infrastructure is that it supports multiple
independent CAs. In a supply chain, each company may
choose which CAs it will accept for binding DNs and
public keys. At this point, most of the current solutions
allow for short-term proxy certificates, stored with
unencrypted private keys, to which a user has delegated
his identity. These certificates are correctly formatted
X.509 certificates, except that they are marked as proxy
certificates and are signed by an end entity rather than a
CA[7].

Figure 2 SMI scenario
2.2 XML Web Service Security
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we investigated related work on security web
service and certificate validation. Then we propose a
design of security system model, emphases on security
web service and privilege management infrastructure.
Finally, we explain function for system and then we
conclude this paper with a brief discussion of future
work.

The XML security standards define XML vocabularies
and processing rules. These standards use legacy
cryptographic and security technologies, as well as
emerging XML technologies, to provide a flexible,
extensible and practical solution toward meeting security
requirements. The XML security standards include XML
digital signature [8]for integrity and signing solutions,
XML encryption [9] for confidentiality, XML key
management (XKMS) [10] for public key registration,
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location and validation, security assertion markup
languages (SAML) [11] for conveying authentication,
authorization and attribute assertions, XML access
control markup language (XACML) [12]for defining
access control rules, and platform for privacy preferences
(P3P) [13]for defining privacy policies and preferences.
Major use cases include securing web services
(WS-Security) [14].
2.3 RBAC Policies in Privilege Management
Role Based Access Controls (RBAC) has generated
significant interest in the last decade. The main entities in
RBAC are the users, the roles and the permissions. A role
can represent a job function, a qualification or expertise.
A permission represents the right to access a target in a
particular mode. Roles are assigned to users in a many to
many relationship, and permissions are granted to roles,
again in a many to many relationship. There is thus a
level of indirection between a user and his access rights.
The benefits of RBAC are widely discussed on lots of
papers [15].

mechanisms for discovering relevant services. Now, the
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and the Web
Services Description Language (WSDL) are widely used
in many applications.
SSS defines standard Web service interfaces and
behaviors that add to Web services the concepts of
stateful service and secure invocation, as well as other
capabilities
needed
to
address
RFID-specific
requirements. These interfaces and behaviors define what
is called a “SSS Service” and allow users to manage the
web service’s life-cycle, as allowed by policy, and to
create sophisticated distributed services.
Our SSS security model casts security functions as SSS
services. This strategy allows well-defined protocols and
interfaces to be defined for these services and permits an
application to outsource security functionality by using a
security service with a particular implementation t fit it
current need.

Edition 4 of X.509 [3], published in 2001, is the first
edition to fully standards the certificates of a Privilege
Management Infrastructure (PMI). X.509 supports
RBAC by defining role specification attribute certificates
that hold the permissions granted to each role, and role
assignment attribute certificates that assign various roles
to the users. Each role and name component in X.500
and LDAP [16] is an attribute type, attribute value pair.
Thus roles and name components are easily
interchangeable. The user is identified by either his/her
LDAP Distinguished Name or his public key certificate
(issuer and serial number). Role assignment ACs may
point to their corresponding role specification AC via the
role specification certificate identifier extension.
A policy is defined which states the rules for assigning
roles to users, and permissions to roles. The policy can
then be used control the accesses to all the targets within
the policy domain [17]. In practice, now we have APIs
that reads in the XML Policy, parses it, and the uses it to
control access to targets within the policy domain. The
API caller, typically an application gateway, passes the
authenticated name of the user, and this is used to
retrieve the user’s attribute certificates (ACs) from the
configured directory (In most case, LDAP server is used).
The API caller passes the user’s requested action on his
chosen target, and again this is checked against the policy.
The API returns either granted or denied to the caller.
3. SECURITY MODEL FOR RFID-ENABLED SCM
We now turn to outline the proposed structure of a
prototype SSS (SCM Security Server).
Web services technologies allow software components to
be defined in terms of access methods, bindings of these
methods to specific communication mechanisms, and

Figure 3 SSS for RFID enabled SCM
The security services include the following.
z Certificate Validation service (CAS): A service
that handles the details of processing and
validating the binding among the subject identity,
the subject public key, and subject attributes.
z Authorization service: A service that evaluates
policy rules regarding the decision to allow the
attempted actins based on information about the
requestor, and details of the request.
z Identity Management service: A service that takes
a user’s identity in one domain and returns the
identity in another (e.g between X.509 and
Kerberos).
z Archiving and Recovery: A service that archiving
and recovery of encryption keys.
z Administration Service: provide administration
workflow with approval and escalation controls.
z Overall Audit: A service that securely logs
relevant information about events.
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For example, SSS perform path validation on a
certificate chain according to the local policy and with
local PKI facilities, such as certificate revocation (CRLs)
or through an OCSP(Online Certificate Status Protocol).
The SSS client generates an ‘SSS validate’ request. This
is essentially asking the SSS server to go and find out the
status of the server’s certificate. Then the SSS server
performs a series of validation tasks. After certificate
status is determined, SSS server replies to client
application with status of the server’s certificate and
application acts accordingly. We use CA database
connection protocol for the purpose of that the server
obtains real-time certificate status information from CAs.
The client use OCSP protocol.
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4.2 Privilege Allocator
The SOA uses the PA to allocate roles to users in the
form of role-assignment ACs. In the simple case of RFID
supply chain, there are two roles – ASN issuer and ASN
receiver. Issues can download any ASN that are
produced.
Once the role-assignment ACs have been created by the
PA, they are stored in a LDAP directory.
Another function of the PA is to create an authorization
policy that is signed digitally as a policy AC. The policy
AC is a standard X.509 AC. The PA prompts the SOA for
the name of the policy fiel and then it copies the contents
into the attribute value. After the SOA has signed the
policy AC, the PA stores it in the SOA’s entry in the
LDAP directory.
4.3 API
A standard authorization
API has already been
defined by the Open Group in 2000. It is called the AZN
API and is specified in the C language. It is based on the
ISO 10181-3 access control framework and specifies the
interface between the access control enforcement
function (AEF) and the access control decision function
(ADF).

Figure 4 Identify Service
4. PMI IMPLEMENTATION
There are three main components to the PMI
implementation – the authorization policy, the privilege
allocator (PA) and the PMI application programming
interface (API).
4.1 Authorization Policy
The authorization policy specifies who has what type of
access to which targets and under what conditions. The
xml.org published a document type definition (DTD) for
the X.500 PMI RBAC policy. It provided a
meta-language that holds the rules for creating the XML
policies. The DTD comprise the following components.
z
z
z
z
z
z
z

SubjectPolicy
RoleHierarchyPolicy
SOAPolicy
RoleAssignmentPolicy
TargetPolicy
ActionPolicy
TargetAccessPolicy

The SOA creates the authorization policy for the domain
using his or her preferred XML editing tool and stores
this in a local file to be used later by the PA.

We rewrite the AZN API with Object-Oriented method,
and select Java language for development. After these
works, the application gateway use API to “construct”
and PMI Java Object, and complete the work by invoke
the methods of this object. The main methods include:
GetCreds, Decision, and Shutdown.
When a user initiates a call to the target, the AEF
authenticates the users, then passes LDAP DN to the
ADF through a call to GetCreds. The ADF uses this DN
to retrieve all role ACs of the user from the list of LDAP
URIs (“pull mode”). The role ACs are validated against
the policy e.g. to check that the DN is within a valid
subject domain, and to check that the ACs are within thje
validity time of the policy etc. Once the user has been
successfully authenticated he will attempt to perform
actions on the target. At each attempt, the AEF passes the
subject object, the target name, and the attempted action
along with its parameters, to the ADF via a call to
Decision. The Decision method will return “Granted” or
“Denied” after executing the checking.
Shutdown method is designed to used in dynamically
deploy new policy in domain. The AEF can follow the
call to Shutdown with a new Constructor call, and this
will cause the ADF to read in the latest policy and be
ready to make access control decisions again.
5. EXPERIMENT
The first demo system for SSS has been implemented
based on the design described in previous section. Some

1048

The Fourth International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB2004) / Beijing

open source projects are used in the demo system, like
Tomcat, Apache SOAP, openCA, and so on. The security
API depends core Java security technology, includes
Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS),
Java Cryptography Extensions (JCE) and Java Secure
Socket Extensions (JSSE).
Security service is complicated system. From the running
result, there are many works to do in the future. We
should consider the performance on the real Internet
environment. We need add more robust integration with
exist system. And next step, the private keys are
generated in the Tags or cards, they can be used as soon
as the user is in possession of his tag or card.
6. CONCLUSION
RFID technology is changing the way organizations
manage their supply chain networks. With RFID,
inventory data becomes more transparent and more
accurate, enabling organizations to speed up delivery,
respond more quickly to customer demand. But
integrating RFID into existing systems has been
prolematic, especially, it let suppliers, manufacturers,
and customers become a virtual organization across the
unsafe internet. We propose a security approach on open
web service to validate certificate based on current web
security environment, and a privilege management
infrastructure used in collaborative business scenario Our
approach will be a model for the future security system
that offers security of open web service security.
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